我国管理人选任主体研究

中图分类号：D922.291.92 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1004-0714（2026）01-0145-04

AStudyontheMainBodyofManagementCandidatesin China

GUOZihan'，MIAOWenwen，DENGZilin

（1.Shangiiale

Mudanjiango;isi6 Prefecture，Yunnan，China）

Abstract：China adopts the"court selection model”to select managers，which results in excessive interventionof judicialpower incorporatebankruptcyactivitiesandisnot conducive toachievingautonomy ofwill amongcreditors，debtors，investorsand other parties.Giventhe legal status of independent civil subjects in China，itisnecessarytoallowcreditors，debtors，and other entitiesto participate in the selectionof managers.Intermsofinstitutional design，adualtrack selectionmodelcan beadopted forliquidation;Pre restructuring canadopt themode ofiselectingthedebtor or negotiatingitheappointment between thedebtor andthe maincreditor;Pre reorganization to reorganization does not require theappointment ofanew administrator in the absenceof significant changes inicircumstances; Reorganization can adopt a dual track selection system or a negotiation selection model between senior executives of the debtor enterprise and major creditors;The settlement can adopt the mode of selection through negotiation between the debtor and the creditor.

Keywords：Bankruptcy Administrator; Selection Mode; Creditor Meetings； Bankruptcy Law; Legal Status; Creditor Meetings

一、引言

随着破产制度的发展，关于优化管理人①选任主体的呼声愈发高涨。（剩余8744字）